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Abstract
The Naor-Yung paradigm (Naor and Yung, STOC ’90) allows to generically boost se-
curity under chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) to security against chosen-ciphertext attacks
(CCA) for public-key encryption (PKE) schemes. The main idea is to encrypt the plain-
text twice (under independent public keys), and to append a non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) proof that the two ciphertexts indeed encrypt the same message. Later work by
Camenisch, Chandran, and Shoup (Eurocrypt ’09) and Naor and Segev (Crypto ’09 and
SIAM J. Comput. ’12) established that the very same techniques can also be used in the
settings of key-dependent message (KDM) and key-leakage attacks (respectively).
In this paper we study the conditions under which the two ciphertexts in the Naor-Yung
construction can share the same random coins. We find that this is possible, provided that
the underlying PKE scheme meets an additional simple property. The motivation for re-
using the same random coins is that this allows to design much more efficient NIZK proofs.
We showcase such an improvement in the random oracle model, under standard complexity
assumptions including Decisional Diffie-Hellman, Quadratic Residuosity, and Subset Sum.
The length of the resulting ciphertexts is reduced by 50%, yielding truly efficient PKE
schemes achieving CCA security under KDM and key-leakage attacks.
As an additional contribution, we design the first PKE scheme whose CPA security
under KDM attacks can be directly reduced to (low-density instances of) the Subset Sum
assumption. The scheme supports key-dependent messages computed via any affine function
of the secret key.
∗Work partially done while the authors were, respectively, with Sapienza University of Rome, Ruhr-Universita¨t
Bochum, and University of Trento.
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1 Introduction
Forty years ago, in their seminal paper [DH76], Diffie and Hellman put forward the concept of
public-key cryptography. Since then, the field has experienced huge advances, making public-
key encryption (PKE) one of the most fundamental and deployed cryptographic applications.
Intuitively, PKE allows a sender to encrypt a message under a receiver’s public key; the receiver
holding the corresponding secret key is the only one able to decrypt the resulting ciphertext,
and thus recover the transmitted message.
Since PKE is ubiquitously employed, there are many different applications demanding dif-
ferent notions of security. An obvious requirement is that it should be unfeasible to recover the
plaintext behind a given ciphertext. This is, however, far from being sufficient, as it does not ex-
clude, e.g., the possibility that one is able to recover parts of the encrypted message or to recover
the message of a different ciphertext. Seminal work on the subject [Yao82, GM84, MRS88] es-
tablished the equivalence of different formulations leading to the following minimal requirement:
No efficient adversary, given a target public key, should be able to distinguish the encryption
of two messages of his choice, which are called the challenge ciphertexts. This notion is often
known under the name of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA), and it is
by far the most basic security requirement a PKE scheme needs to meet.
Unfortunately, CPA security does not consider adversaries able to alter an encrypted mes-
sage, making this notion unsuitable for applications like, e.g., online auctions, where an adver-
sary should be unable to slightly increase the offer of a previous bidder by altering his encrypted
offer. In such settings ciphertexts must be non-malleable [DDN91, BDPR98, PSV07, CDTV16],
meaning that it be hard, given a ciphertext encrypting some message, to create a valid ciphertext
encrypting a related message.
The de-facto standard notion of security for PKE, which implies both CPA security and non-
malleability, is called indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). CCA security
requires that CPA security should hold even in the presence of decryption queries, i.e., the
adversary is allowed to ask for the decryption of arbitrary (possibly altered) ciphertexts (except
the challenge ciphertexts itself). The famous attack on PKCS #1 by Bleichenbacher [Ble98]
1
has shown that CCA security is not only a theoretical matter, and this is particularly true for
a fundamental and widely employed primitive such as PKE.
KDM security. In fact, even CCA security is not enough for all possible applications of
PKE. In a key-dependent message (KDM) attack, an adversary might see (or generate) cipher-
texts encrypting messages related to the secret key. This is the case, e.g., in disk encryption
software (including Windows Vista’s BitLocker utility) and in certain anonymous credential
systems [CL01], or could be due to careless key management. Further, to apply techniques like
bootstrapping [Gen09] or key-switching [BGV12], in order to reduce the noise and ciphertext
growth in fully-homomorphic encryption, it is necessary to publish a ciphertext which encrypts
its own secret key. The notions of CPA/CCA security can be extended to the KDM setting by
requiring that encryptions of messages depending on the secret key (via adversarial functions)
are indistinguishable from encryptions of a fixed string [BRS02, CL01].
Several PKE schemes with CPA/CCA-KDM security exist, under different complexity as-
sumptions including Learning with Errors [ACPS09, BGK11], Decisional Diffie-Hellman [BHHO08,
BGK11, Hof13, Wee16], Quadratic Residuosity [BG10, Hof13, Wee16], Learning Parity with
Noise [Do¨t15], and indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions [MPS16]. A weaker
security guarantee, where there is an a-priori upper bound on the total number of adversarial
KDM queries, was put forward by Galindo, Herranz and Villar [GHV12].
Key-leakage security. Key-leakage attacks are another example of a setting in which stan-
dard CPA/CCA security is not enough. Such attacks model an adversary having access to a
piece of hardware implementing a cryptographic primitive, and trying to learn learn partial
information on the secret key by means of so-called side-channel attacks, exploiting physical
phenomena such as timing [Koc96], power consumption [KJJ99], and electronic emission [QS01].
Such (bounded) key-leakage attacks can be captured within the notions of CPA/CCA security
by empowering the adversary with access to a so-called Λ-leakage oracle: Upon input an effi-
ciently computable function, the oracle returns the result of the function applied to the secret
key, for a total of at most Λ bits.
Several PKE schemes with CPA/CCA security under bounded key-leakage attacks exist,
under different complexity assumptions including Learning with Errors [AGV09], Decisional
Diffie-Hellman [NS09, DHLW10, NS12], and Quadratic Residuosity [BG10].
Naor-Yung paradigm. The Naor-Yung paradigm is a method to generically transform a
CPA-secure PKE scheme into a CCA-secure one, in a non-black-box way. Specifically, to encrypt
a given message m, one samples two independent public keys pk and pk ′ for the underlying CPA-
secure PKE, encrypts the message m twice yielding ciphertexts c and c′ (the first one under pk
and the second one under pk ′), and finally gives a non-interactive proof pi that the ciphertexts
indeed encrypt the same message. One can show that if the non-interactive proof satisfies zero-
knowledge, and moreover it is simulation-sound [Sah99], the resulting PKE scheme meets CCA
security.
Later work by Camenisch, Chandran, and Shoup [CCS09], and by Naor and Segev [NS09,
NS12], showed that the original Naor-Yung paradigm also works in the more generic settings
of KDM attacks and key-leakage attacks. However, in the standard model, the resulting PKE
scheme is not very efficient due to the cost of simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) proof systems. Since efficiency is crucial in many applications, and also one of the
main obstacles for employing cryptographic primitives in the real world, a common approach
to improve efficiency is to consider the random oracle model (ROM) due to Bellare and Rog-
away [BR93]. A cryptographic scheme in the ROM employs a hash function that is modelled as
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an external random function accessible by all parties (including the adversary). While random
oracles offer only heuristic security, in the sense that in some cases it might be even impossible
to implement them in practice [CGH04], they allow for dramatic efficiency improvements, and
in fact, many cryptographic primitives implemented in nowadays standards are analyzed in the
ROM.
NIZKs are not an exception in this respect, and indeed, as shown by Faust et al. [FKMV12],
the powerful Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] allows to instantiate the NIZK in the Naor-Yung
construction in the ROM, yielding the most efficient realizations of PKE schemes with CCA
security under KDM and key-leakage attacks known today.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we contribute to the line of research on secure PKE in the following ways.
A twist of Naor-Yung. We analyze a slight modification of the original Naor-Yung paradigm.
The main idea is to have the two ciphertexts c and c′ share the same random coins. As we
will see, this allows for a substantial efficiency improvement in the design of the NIZK, yielding
beyond state-of-the-art PKE schemes with CCA security under KDM and key-leakage attacks
(in the ROM).
Our analysis (see Section 3) shows that the above idea indeed works, provided that the
underlying CPA-secure PKE scheme meets an additional property that we dub “randomness
fusion”: Given two ciphertexts c and c′ of messages m and m′ respectively (computed under
independent public keys pk and pk ′) it is possible to re-randomize (c, c′) into a new pair (c˜, c˜′)
such that the distribution of (c˜, c˜′) is statistically close to the distribution of (cˆ, cˆ′), where (cˆ, cˆ′)
are computed using the normal encryption with the same (uniform) randomness r∗.
A similar requirement has been put forward by Bellare et al. [BBS03] in their study of
randomness re-use in multi-recipient PKE. As we will argue later when defining our requirement
in more detail, randomness fusion is weaker than the property defined in [BBS03], but still
suffices for our application.
KDM security from Subset Sum. As a contribution of independent interest, in Section 4,
we design the first PKE scheme whose KDM-CPA security can be based directly on low-density
instances of the Subset Sum problem. Such an assumption is particularly interesting given its
robustness to quantum attacks [BJLM13]. The set of supported KDM functions consists of
all possible (efficiently computable) affine modifications of the secret key; a result of Apple-
baum [App11, App14] allows to generically boost this form of KDM security to security against
all functions that can be computed in some fixed polynomial time.
Our construction borrows ideas from Applebaum et al. [ACPS09], that we needed to carefully
adapt to the case of Subset Sum. The PKE scheme we design can be effectively used in our
framework (as we argue below), yielding a truly efficient PKE scheme with KDM-CCA security
from the Subset Sum assumption (in the ROM).
Comparison. Finally, we instantiate our twist of the Naor-Yung construction under three
complexity assumptions: Decisional Diffie-Hellman, Quadratic Residuosity, and Subset Sum.
As our analysis shows (see Section 5, Table 1), ciphertexts computed via our approach are
shorter by a factor of roughly 50% compared to those one would obtain via the original Naor-
Yung paradigm.
The reason behind such an efficiency improvement is best understood using an example.
Consider the ElGamal PKE scheme [ElG85], whose CPA-security can be based on the Decisional
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Diffie-Hellman assumption. A public key consists of a single element h, within a cyclic group
G of prime order q (with generator g); an encryption of m ∈ G under h equals c := (c1, c2) =
(gr, hr · m), for uniform randomness r ∈ Zq. The PKE scheme is easily seen to meet the
randomness fusion property.1
When using the above PKE scheme in the original Naor-Yung construction one samples
two independent public keys h, h′ ∈ G, and computes a “double encryption” of message m
by defining c := (c1, c2) = (g
r, hr · m) and c′ := (c′1, c′2) = (gr
′
, (h′)r′ · m), for independent
randomness r, r′ ∈ Zq. Finally, one needs to compute a (simulation-sound) NIZK proof pi for
the fact that c and c′ are well-distributed ciphertexts encrypting the same messages; this is
equivalent to showing knowledge of r, r′ such that c1 = gr, c′1 = gr
′
, and c2/c
′
2 = h
r/(h′)r′ . We
refer to the pair x := (r, r′) as the witness, and to y := (h, (c1, c2), h′, (c′1, c′2)) as the statement
to be proven.
The standard way to compute pi (in the ROM) is by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic [FS86] to a so-called Sigma-protocol for the above considered language.2 In the case of
ElGamal (see [FKMV12, Section 5]) pi := (α, γ), where α := (α1, α2, α3) = (g
s, gs
′
, hs · (h′)s′)
and γ := (γ1, γ2) = (s − βr, s′ + βr′), with random s, s′ ∈ Zq and β implicitly defined as
β := H(y||α) through the application of the random oracle H. This way, a ciphertext consists
of 9 group elements. Using our twist of the Naor-Yung construction one can completely drop
α2 and γ2, thus saving 3 group elements (note that c1 = c
′
1). Hence, a ciphertext consists of 6
group elements, yielding a 33% gain in ciphertext size.
While the above instantiation is not interesting on its own right (as one can obtain CCA
security in the standard model under the same complexity assumption, with even shorter ci-
phertexts [CS98]) it contains the crux of our method, and moreover it constitutes the base for
understanding our concrete instantiations for KDM and key-leakage security in Section 5.
1.2 Related Work
The first PKE scheme with CPA security directly based on Subset Sum has been constructed
by Lyubashevsky, Palacio, and Segev [LPS10]; their work has been extended to the setting of
CCA security by Faust, Masny, and Venturi [FMV16]. Subset Sum also found application in
the context of outsourced pattern matching [FHV13].
While we focused on public-key encryption, KDM security can also be defined in the secret-
key setting. See, among others, [BRS02, ACPS09]. Sometimes KDM security is defined in a
multi-key variant, where there are polynomially many public/secret key pairs, and the key-
dependent message is chosen as a function of all the keys. Although our twist of the Naor-Yung
paradigm works even in the multi-user setting, our Subset Sum based PKE scheme is only
proven secure in the single-key setting.
Many definitions for security under key-leakage attacks exist in the literature, beyond the
setting of bounded leakage considered in this paper. We refer the reader directly to the literature
(e.g., [ADW09b, SPY+10]) for a more in-depth discussion on the relevance of each definition.
We also dispose of many leakage-resilient primitives beyond public-key encryption, see, among
many others, [DP08, ADW09a, KV09, DDV10, BSW13, NVZ14, FNV15].
Rackoff and Simon [RS91] considered a variation of the Naor-Yung paradigm in which the
sender encrypts the message only once, and then it proves in zero-knowledge that it knows
the plaintext corresponding to the transmitted ciphertext. In order for this to work, the NIZK
1In fact, it satisfies the reproducibility test of Bellare et al. [BBS03] which implies the randomness fusion
property.
2A Sigma-protocol is a public-coin interactive protocol consisting of three messages (α, β, γ), satisfying certain
properties; see Section 5 for a more precise definition.
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proof system needs to satisfy a stronger version of soundness known as simulation extractability.
Unfortunately, this paradigm does not lead to very efficient instantiations in the ROM due to the
fact that Fiat-Shamir NIZK are not known to be simulation extractable. (See [BFW15, BFW16]
for negative indications on this matter.) An alternative (always in the ROM) is to use Fischlin’s
transformation [Fis05], but the price to instantiate the NIZK might be higher [DV14].
An alternative construction to generically boost CPA security to CCA security for PKE
in the random oracle model is due to Fujisaki and Okamoto [FO99]. The security of this
construction under KDM attacks has been analyzed by Kitagawa et al. [KMHT16].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We write λ ∈ N for the security parameter. We say that a function ν is negligible in λ, if it is
asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any polynomial in λ, i.e. ν(λ) = λ−ω(1). An algorithm
A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized, and for any input x, r ∈ {0, 1}∗ the
computation of A(x; r) (i.e., A with input x and random coins r) terminates in at most poly(|x|)
steps. When the coins are left implicit, we write y←$ A(x) to denote the output of A(x; r) with
uniform randomness. If X is a set, then x←$ X denotes that x is sampled uniformly at random
from X .
For a distribution D, we denote with x←$ D that x is sampled according to the distribution
D. For two distributions D and D′ over a shared domain D we write D(x) for the probability
assigned to x ∈ D and ∆ (D,D′) := 12
∑
x∈D |D(x)−D′(x)| for the statistical distance between
D and D′. Whenever the statistical distance is negligible, we write D ≈s D′. Similarly, given
two ensembles X = {Xλ}λ∈N and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N, we write X ≈c Y to denote that the two
ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.
Vectors and matrices are denoted in boldface. For two vectors u,v, with u = (u1, . . . , un)
and v = (v1, . . . , vn), the inner product between u and v is defined as 〈u,v〉 :=
∑n
i=1 ui · vi.
The Hadamard product between u and v is defined as u ◦ v := (u1 · v1, . . . , un · vn).
We represent elements in Zp as values in the range [−(p − 1)/2, (p − 1)/2], where p > 2
is a prime number. The absolute value of v ∈ Zp, denoted |v|, is the absolute value of the
corresponding value in [−(p−1)/2, (p−1)/2], and the infinity norm of a vector v := (v1, . . . , vn) ∈
Znp is ‖v‖∞ := maxi∈[n] |vi|. We will also use the following rounding functions: b·e : R → Z,
which maps a real number to its closest integer; b·c : R → Z, which maps a real number to its
closest smaller integer; and d·e : R→ Z, which maps a real number to its closest larger integer.
For any q, p ∈ N, we denote by bxep : Zq → Zp the rounding function bxep := bpq · xe; in case v
is a vector, we write bvep for the application of b·ep component wise.
2.2 Public-Key Encryption
A Public-Key Encryption (PKE) scheme is a tuple of algorithms Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) defined as
follows. (1) Algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter, and outputs a public/secret
key pair (pk , sk); for a given value of the security parameter λ ∈ N, the set of all secret keys is
denoted by SKλ and the set of all public keys by PKλ. (2) The randomized algorithm Enc takes
as input the public key pk , a message m ∈ M, and implicit randomness r ∈ R, and outputs a
ciphertext c = Enc(pk ,m; r); the set of all ciphertexts is denoted by C, and we sometimes write
µ ∈ N for the bit-length of a plaintext m ∈ M. (3) The deterministic algorithm Dec takes as
input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, and outputs m = Dec(sk , c) which is either equal
to some message m ∈M or to an error symbol ⊥.
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Experiment Expkdm-ccaΠ,A (λ,F):
(pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ); b←$ {0, 1}
Qdec,Qkdm ← ∅
b′ ← AOdecsk (·),Okdmsk,b (·)(pk)
Return (b′ = b) ∧ (Qdec ∩Qkdm = ∅)
Oracle Okdmsk ,b (f):
If b = 0
Return c←$ Enc(pk , 0µ)
Else
Return c←$ Enc(pk , f(sk))
Qkdm ← Qkdm ∪ {c}
Oracle Odecsk (c):
Return Dec(sk , c)
Qdec ← Qdec ∪ {c}
Figure 1: Experiment defining KDM security of a PKE scheme.
Correctness. We say that Π satisfies correctness if, for all (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), there exists a
negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that that P[Dec(sk ,Enc(pk ,m)) = m] ≥ 1− ν(λ) (where
the randomness is taken over the internal coin tosses of algorithm Enc).
KDM security. We now turn to defining key-dependent message (KDM) security for PKE,
both in the case of chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) and chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA).
Definition 1 (KDM security). Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a PKE scheme with message space
M and secret-key space SKλ (for security parameter λ ∈ N), and let F : SKλ →M be a set of
efficiently computable functions. We say that Π has F-key-dependent message security under
chosen-ciphertext attacks (F-KDM-CCA for short), if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a
negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that∣∣∣∣P [Expkdm-ccaΠ,A (λ,F) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ),
where the experiment Expkdm-ccaΠ,A (λ,F) is defined in Figure 1.
Moreover, we say that Π has F-KDM-CPA security if the above holds for all PPT adversaries
that are not allowed any query to oracle Odecsk (·); in this case we denote by Expkdm-cpaΠ,A (λ,F)
the corresponding experiment.
We remark that F-KDM-CPA security implies standard CPA security by considering the
set F of all constant functions that output a given (hard-coded) plaintext in the message space,
i.e. Fmsg := {fm : fm(·) = m}m∈M.
Key-leakage security. Informally a PKE scheme is CPA-secure under Λ-key-leakage attacks
if it remains CPA-secure even given Λ bits of (adaptive) leakage on the secret key [NS09,
DHLW10]. CCA security under Λ-key-leakage attacks is defined similarly, but now the adversary
can additionally ask for decryption queries.
Definition 2 (Key-leakage security). Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a PKE scheme with message
space M and secret-key space SKλ (for security parameter λ ∈ N), and let OΛsk (·) be an
oracle depending on a secret key sk ∈ SKλ, which takes as input (the description of) functions
fi : SKλ → {0, 1}Λi and returns a total of at most
∑
i Λi ≤ Λ bits. We say that Π has Λ-
key-leakage security under chosen-ciphertext attacks (Λ-LKG-CCA for short), if for all PPT
adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that∣∣∣∣P [Explkg-ccaΠ,A (λ,Λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ),
where the experiment Explkg-ccaΠ,A (λ,Λ) is defined in Figure 2. Π has Λ-LKG-CPA security if the
above holds for all PPT adversaries that are not allowed any query to oracle Odecsk (·).
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Experiment Explkg-ccaΠ,A (λ,Λ):
(pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ); b←$ {0, 1}
Qdec ← ∅
(m0,m1)← AOdecsk (·),OΛsk (·)(pk)
cb ← Enc(pk,mb)
b′ ← AOdecsk (·)(cb)
Return (b′ = b) ∧ (cb 6∈ Qdec)
Oracle Odecsk (c):
Return Dec(sk , c)
Qdec ← Qdec ∪ {c}
Oracle OΛsk (f):
Return f(sk)
Figure 2: Experiment defining key-leakage security of a PKE scheme.
2.3 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Argument Systems
A decision problem related to a language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ requires to determine if a given string y
is in L or not. We can associate to any NP -language L a polynomial-time recognizable relation
R ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ defining L itself, i.e. L = {y : ∃x s.t. (y, x) ∈ R} for |x| ≤ poly(|y|). The
string x is called a witness for membership of y ∈ L.
Let L be an NP -language. We now recall the definition of a non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) argument system for L, in the random oracle model (ROM). Let H be a hash function
(modeled as a random oracle). A non-interactive argument system for L is a pair of PPT
algorithms (PH ,VH) specified as follows. (1) Algorithm PH takes as input a pair (y, x) such
that (y, x) ∈ R, and returns a proof pi. (2) Algorithm VH takes as input a pair (y, pi) and
returns a decision bit. We write PH , VH , to specify that both algorithms are allowed random
oracle queries.
By correctness, we mean that VH(y, pi) = 1 whenever pi←$ PH(y, x) and (y, x) ∈ R. Be-
low, we define two further properties of non-interactive arguments, namely zero-knowledge and
simulation soundness. The definitions are taken from [FKMV12].
Zero-knowledge. The zero-knowledge property captures the intuition that a non-interactive
proof pi for a given statement y does not reveal anything beyond the fact that y ∈ L. This
intuition is formalized by the existence of an efficient simulator S that is able to simulate
pi without knowing a witness. Note that, as we make explicit in the definition below, the
simulator is allowed to fully control the random oracle, a flavor that is sometimes known as
zero-knowledge in the explicitly programmable random oracle model [Wee09].
Definition 3 (NIZK). Let L be an NP -language, and let H be a hash function (modeled
as a random oracle). Denote by S1,S2 the oracles such that S1(·) returns the first output of
(h, τ)←$ S(1, τ, ·), and S2(y, x) returns the first output of (pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ, y) if (y, x) ∈ R, where
τ ∈ {0, 1}∗ denotes some arbitrary state information shared between S1 and S2. We say that
(PH ,VH) is a NIZK for L in the random oracle model if there exists a PPT simulator S such
that, for all PPT distinguishers D, there is a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] for which∣∣∣P [DH(·),PH(·,·)(1λ) = 1]− P [DS1(·),S2(·,·)(1λ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ),
where both oracles P and S2 return ⊥ in case (y, x) 6∈ R.
Simulation soundness. The simulation soundness property captures the intuition that it
should be hard to find an accepting proof pi for a false statement y 6∈ L, even after seeing
polynomially many simulated proofs of possibly false statements.
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Definition 4 (Simulation soundness). Let L be an NP -language, and let H be a hash function
(modeled as a random oracle). Consider a NIZK (PH ,VH) for L, with zero-knowledge simulator
S. Denote by S1, S
′
2 the oracles such that S1(·) returns the first output of (h, τ)←$ S(1, τ, ·),
and S′2(y) returns the first output of (pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ, y). We say that (PH ,VH) is simulation
sound in the random oracle model if, for all PPT adversaries A, there is a negligible function
ν : N→ [0, 1] such that
P
[
VS1(y∗, pi∗) = 1 ∧ y∗ 6∈ L ∧ (y∗, pi∗) 6∈ Q : (y∗, pi∗)←$ AS1(·),S′2(·)(1λ)
]
≤ ν(λ),
where Q contains the list of pairs (yi, pii) such that yi was asked to S′2 yielding answer pii.
3 Naor-Yung Paradigm with Shared Randomness
We start by describing a twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm, in Section 3.1, where the same
random string is used to generate both ciphertexts in the Naor-Yung construction. Then, in
Section 3.2, we put forward a simple property of a PKE scheme which will be useful for proving
security of the modified Naor-Yung paradigm. Our main theorem, and its proof, can be found
in Section 3.3 (for the case of KDM security), and in Section 3.4 (for the case of key-leakage).
3.1 A Twist of Naor-Yung
The original Naor-Yung paradigm combines two CPA-secure PKE schemes Π and Π′ into a
new PKE scheme Π∗ that achieves CCA security [NY90]. A ciphertext in Π∗ consists of two
independent encryptions of the same message (using fresh randomness), together with a non-
interactive proof that the two ciphertexts indeed encrypt the same message. This paradigm was
later extended to the setting of KDM security by Camenisch, Chandran and Shoup [CCS09],
and to the setting of key-leakage by Naor and Segev [NS09, NS12].
Below, we present a twist of the Naor-Yung construction in which the two encryptions
share the same random coins. As we will see in the sequel (cf. Section 5), this allows for
significant efficiency improvements in the size of the resulting non-interactive proofs. Although
our construction works for any pair of PKE schemes with shared message and randomness space,
for simplicity we consider the special case in which Π′ = Π.
Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a PKE scheme with message spaceM and randomness space R,
and let (PH ,VH) be a NIZK in the ROM for the following NP -language
LΠNY :=
{
(pk , pk ′, c, c′) : ∃m, r∗ s.t. c = Enc(pk ,m; r∗), c′ = Enc(pk ′,m; r∗)} . (1)
The modified PKE scheme Π∗ = (Gen∗,Enc∗,Dec∗) is described in Fig. 3.
3.2 Randomness Fusion
We now put forward a simple property of a PKE scheme Π which will be useful for proving
security of the modified Naor-Yung construction. Informally, the property says that given two
ciphertexts c and c′ of messages m and m′ respectively (computed under independent public keys
pk and pk ′) it is possible to re-randomize (c, c′) into a new pair (c˜, c˜′) such that the distribution
of (c˜, c˜′) is statistically close to the distribution of (cˆ, cˆ′), where (cˆ, cˆ′) are computed using Enc
with the same (uniform) random coins r∗.
Definition 5 (Randomness fusion). Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a PKE scheme. We say that
Π satisfies the randomness fusion property if there exists a PPT algorithm Rand such that, for
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Naor-Yung Paradigm with Shared Randomness
Consider the following PKE scheme Π∗ = (Gen∗,Enc∗,Dec∗) based on an auxiliary PKE scheme
Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) and on a non-interactive argument system (PH ,VH) for the language LΠNY
of Eq. (1).
Key generation: Given as input the security parameter λ, algorithm Gen∗ runs Gen twice
obtaining (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ) and (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ). Hence, it outputs pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) and
sk∗ = sk (the key sk ′ is erased).
Encryption: Given as input a message m ∈ M, algorithm Enc∗ samples random coins
r∗←$R, computes c = Enc(pk ,m; r∗) and c′ = Enc(pk ′,m; r∗), and obtains a proof
pi←$ PH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), (m, r∗)) for membership of (pk , pk ′, c, c′) ∈ LΠNY. Hence, it outputs the
ciphertext c∗ = (c, c′, pi).
Decryption: Given as input a ciphertext c∗ = (c, c′, pi), algorithm Dec∗ first runs VH((pk , pk ′, c,
c′), pi); if the output is zero Dec∗ outputs ⊥ and stops. Otherwise, it outputs the same as
Dec(sk , c).
Figure 3: Modified Naor-Yung construction
all m,m′ ∈ M, it holds that Dm,m′ ≈s D˜m,m′ , where the distributions Dm,m′ and D˜m,m′ are
defined as follows:
Dm,m′ :=
{
(cˆ, cˆ′) : (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1
λ); (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ); r∗←$R
cˆ = Enc(pk ,m; r∗); cˆ′ = Enc(pk ′,m′; r∗)
}
(2)
D˜m,m′ :=
(c˜, c˜′) :
(pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ); (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ); r, r′←$R
c = Enc(pk ,m; r); c′ = Enc(pk ′,m′; r′)
aux := (pk , pk ′, sk ′, r′,m′); (c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), aux)
 . (3)
Although the above definition appears to be quite technical, the intuition behind it is pretty
simple, and moreover many natural schemes, including the ones we consider in Section 5, directly
meet this property, without requiring any modification. Looking ahead, randomness fusion is
exactly the property one needs in order to analyse our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm. In fact,
readers familiar with the security proof of the original Naor-Yung construction might already
observe that the particular choice of the auxiliary information is compliant with the information
known by the reduction from CPA to CCA security.
Alternative formulations. A particular case is the one where the distribution of ciphertexts
using independent randomness or shared randomness are directly statistically close. Such a
requirement is more stringent, and can be cast in Definition 5 by requiring that Rand simply
outputs the pair (c, c′).
Yet another variation of the above property has been considered by Bellare et al. [BBS03]
in their study of randomness re-use in multi-recipient PKE. The reproducibility test of [BBS03]
can be cast in Definition 5 by requiring that Dm,m′ and D˜m,m′ are identically distributed, and
moreover Rand can produce the pair (c˜, c˜′) without knowing the randomness r′ (corresponding
to ciphertext c′).
Our choice to go for the formulation above is due to the fact that Definition 5 is a weaker
requirement, yet it is sufficient to prove security of our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm.
3.3 Main Theorem: KDM Security
We now turn to state our main theorem, which quantifies the security of our twist of the
Naor-Yung paradigm.
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Game G0-9:
(pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ)
(pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ)
sk∗ = sk
b←$ {0, 1}
Qdec,Qkdm,QH ← ∅
b′ ← AOdecsk∗ (·),Okdmsk∗,b(·)(pk∗)
Return (b′ = b) ∧ (Qdec ∩Qkdm = ∅)
Oracle OH(x):
If (x, ·) 6∈ QH
h←$ {0, 1}∗ \G0,8,9
(h, τ)←$ S(1, τ, x) \G1-7
QH ← QH ∪ {(x, h)}
Return h
Else
Return h
Oracle Odecsk∗(c∗):
If VH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), pi) = 0
Return ⊥
Else
Return Dec(sk , c) \G0-3,9
Return Dec(sk ′, c′) \G4-8
Qdec ← Qdec ∪ {c∗}
Oracle Okdmsk∗,b(f):
r, r′←$R
c = Enc(pk , f(sk); r) \G0-5
c = Enc(pk , 0µ ; r) \G6-9
c′ = Enc(pk ′, f(sk); r) \G0,1
c′ = Enc(pk ′, f(sk); r′ ) \G2
c′ = Enc(pk ′, 0µ ; r′) \G3-6
c′ = Enc(pk ′, 0µ; r ) \G7-9
aux = (pk , pk ′, sk , r, f(sk)) \G2-4
aux = (pk , pk ′, sk , r, 0µ ) \G5-6
(c, c′)←$ Rand((c, c′), aux) \G2-6
pi←$ PH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), r) \G0,8,9
(pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c, c′)) \G1-7
c∗ = (c, c′, pi)
Return c∗
Qkdm ← Qkdm ∪ {c∗}
Figure 4: Games in the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Main theorem, KDM security). Let Π be a PKE scheme satisfying F-KDM-CPA
security and with the randomness fusion property (cf. Definition 5), and let (PH ,VH) be a
simulation-sound NIZK for the language LΠNY of Eq. (1). Then, the PKE scheme Π
∗ described
in Fig. 3 satisfies F-KDM-CCA security in the random oracle model.
Proof. We consider a series of games, depicted in Fig. 4, where the initial game is identical to the
KDM-CCA experiment with hidden bit b = 1 and the last game is identical to the KDM-CCA
experiment with b = 0. Hence, we show that the games are computationally indistinguishable
unless one of the assumptions in the theorem statement is violated. This implies the theorem.
Game G0: This game is identical to the KDM-CCA security experiment for Π
∗, with hidden bit
b = 1. In particular, adversary A has access to the oracle Okdmsk∗,1(·), that upon input a query
f ∈ F returns Enc∗(pk∗, f(sk)). The oracle Odecsk∗(·), on input a ciphertext c∗ := (c, c′, pi),
first checks that VH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), pi) = 1; hence, it returns Dec(sk , c).
Game G1: We change the way ciphertexts returned by the KDM oracle are computed. In
particular, the proof pi attached to each ciphertext is now obtained by running the
zero-knowledge simulator, as in (pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c, c′)). Furthermore, algorithm
S(1, τ, ·) is used to answer random oracle queries.
Game G2: We change the way ciphertexts returned by the KDM oracle are computed. In
particular, instead of computing c and c′ using the same randomness r∗←$R, we sample
r, r′←$R, let c = Enc(pk , f(sk); r) and c′ = Enc(pk ′, f(sk); r′), and re-randomize (c, c′)
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by running Rand((c, c′), aux) with aux = (pk , pk ′, sk , r, f(sk)). Note that, since the two
ciphertexts use independent randomness, the attached simulated proof pi is a proof of a
false statement.
Game G3: We change the way ciphertexts returned by the KDM oracle are computed. In
particular, we now let c′ = Enc(pk ′, 0µ; r′). Note that algorithm Rand always takes a
single secret key as input, and this will be important while arguing indistinguishability
with the previous game.
Game G4: We change the way decryption queries are answered. In particular, upon input a
decryption query c∗ = (c, c′, pi), we verify the proof pi (as before), and return Dec(sk ′, c′)
whenever pi is accepting.
Game G5: We change the way ciphertexts returned by the KDM oracle are computed. In par-
ticular, the auxiliary information used by algorithm Rand is changed to aux = (pk , pk ′, sk ′,
r′, 0µ).
Game G6: We change the way ciphertexts returned by the KDM oracle are computed. In
particular, the ciphertext c is obtained as an encryption of 0µ, i.e. c = Enc(pk , 0µ; r) for
r←$R.
Game G7: We change the way ciphertexts returned by the KDM oracle are computed. In
particular, we do not run algorithm Rand anymore. This means that the ciphertexts c
and c′ are now obtained again using the same random coins r∗←$R, and thus the proof
pi is for a true statement.
Game G8: We change the way ciphertexts returned by the KDM oracle are computed. In par-
ticular, the proof pi is now obtained using the real prover algorithm, as in pi←$ PH((pk , pk ′,
c, c′), (0µ, r∗)). Furthermore, random oracle queries are answered using the random oracle
H.
Game G9: We change the way decryption queries are answered. In particular, we now return
Dec(sk , c) (as long as the proof pi is accepting). This yields a distribution identical to the
one in the KDM-CCA security experiment for Π∗, with hidden bit b = 0.
Next, we proceed to show indistinguishability of the above defined games.
Claim 1. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν0,1 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G0 = 1]− P [G1 = 1]| ≤ ν0,1(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between G0 and G1 is that the ciphertexts returned by
the KDM oracle contain proofs pi that are computed by running the real prover (with witness
(f(sk), r∗)) in the former game, while the zero-knowledge simulator is used in the latter game.
Moreover, in game G1 the queries to the random oracle are simulated by running S(1, τ, ·).
Thus, the claim follows readily from the non-interactive zero-knowledge property of (PH ,VH)
(cf. Definition 3).
Claim 2. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν1,2 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G1 = 1]− P [G2 = 1]| ≤ ν1,2(λ).
Proof of claim. Game G2 is identical to G1, except that in the former algorithm Rand is run to
re-randomize the pair of ciphertexts (c, c′), for each query to the KDM oracle. Put differently,
the pair (c, c′) corresponding to each ciphertext c∗ computed inside the KDM oracle is sampled
from the distribution Df(sk),f(sk) in game G1, while the distribution D˜f(sk),f(sk) is used in G2,
where the distributions D and D˜ are defined in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3).
We use a hybrid argument, where we switch the answer to KDM queries one by one. By the
randomness fusion property of the PKE scheme (cf. Definition 5), we know that Df(sk),f(sk) and
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D˜f(sk),f(sk) are statistically close, and so must be each pair of adjecent hybrids, and therefore
also G1 and G2.
Claim 3. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν2,3 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G2 = 1]− P [G3 = 1]| ≤ ν2,3(λ).
Proof of claim. Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p2,3(·) such that, for
infinitely many values of λ ∈ N, we have |P [G2 = 1]− P [G3 = 1]| ≥ 1/p2,3(λ). We construct a
PPT adversary A′ breaking CPA security (and thus Fmsg-KDM-CPA security,3 see Section 2.2)
of Π, as follows.
• Receive pk ′ from the challenger, sample (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′)
to A.
• Upon input a query f to the KDM oracle, let m¯ := f(sk) and forward fm¯ ∈ Fmsg to the
target KDM oracle receiving back a ciphertext c′ (computed using fresh coins r′←$R);
compute c = Enc(pk , f(sk); r) using fresh coins r←$R, run (c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), (pk , pk ′,
sk , r, f(sk))), simulate the proof pi←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′)), and return c˜∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Upon input a query c∗ = (c, c′, pi) to the decryption oracle, answer this query as in both
G2 and G3 (i.e., by decrypting c using sk , after verifying the proof pi).
• Return the same guess as that of A.
Depending on A′’s target oracle being initialized either with hidden bit b = 1 or b = 0, we obtain
exactly the same distribution as in game G2 or G3. As a consequence, the above simulation is
perfect. and A′ retains the same advantage as A. The claim follows.
Claim 4. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν3,4 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G3 = 1]− P [G4 = 1]| ≤ ν3,4(λ).
Proof of claim. Notice that G3 and G4 use a different decryption procedure; in particular,
decryption queries are answered using the secret key sk in the former game, while sk ′ is used in
the latter game. The proof is down to the simulation soundness property of the NIZK. Consider
the following event, defined over the probability space of game G4: The event E becomes
true whenever there exists a decryption query c∗i = (ci, c
′
i, pi
′
i) such that pi
′
i is accepting but
Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i). Notice that the distributions of G3 and G4 are identical conditioned
on event E not happening, hence, by a standard argument, it suffices to bound the probability
that event E happens.
Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p3,4(·), such that for infinitely
many values of λ ∈ N adversary A provokes event E (in game G4) with probability at least
1/p3,4(λ). We construct a PPT adversary A
′ attacking simulation soundness of (PH ,VH), as
follows.
• Run (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) to A.
• Upon input a query f ∈ F to the KDM oracle, compute the pair of ciphertexts (c˜, c˜′) as
in game G4, i.e. let c = Enc(pk , f(sk); r), c
′ = Enc(pk ′, 0µ; r′), and (c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′),
aux). Hence, forward the statement (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′) to the target simulation oracle obtaining
a proof pi, and return c∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Answer A’s queries to the decryption oracle as in game G4; this can be done because the
reduction knows the secret key sk ′.
• Let (c1, c′1, pi1), . . . , (cq, c′q, piq) be the list of A’s decryption queries. Find an index i ∈ [q]
such that VS(1,τ,·)((pk , pk ′, ci, c′i), pii) = 1 and Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i); return ((pk , pk ′, ci,
c′i), pii).
3Strictly speaking, we need to assume that Fmsg ⊆ F , but this is the case for all interesting classes F .
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Note that the simulation done by A′ is perfect. Thus, A will provoke event E with probability
1/p3,4(λ), and A
′ breaks simulation soundness of the NIZK with the same probability. This
concludes the proof of the claim.
Claim 5. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν4,5 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G4 = 1]− P [G5 = 1]| ≤ ν4,5(λ).
Proof of claim. Game G4 and G5 differ on the auxiliary information provided to the algorithm
Rand. Namely, the ciphertexts (c, c′) corresponding to each query to the KDM oracle are
sampled from the distribution D˜f(sk),f(sk) in the former game, while the distribution D˜f(sk),0µ
is used in the latter game.
Define the hybrid game G4.5, where instead of running algorithm Rand the ciphertexts (c, c
′)
corresponding to each query to the KDM oracle are sampled from the distribution Df(sk),0µ of
Eq. (2). A straightforward reduction to the CPA security (or the Fmsg-KDM-CPA security) of
Π shows that D˜f(sk),f(sk) ≈c Df(sk),0µ . By a standard hybrid argument, where we switch the
answer to KDM queries one by one, the above implies that G4 ≈c G4.5.
Now, using the randomness fusion property of the PKE scheme (cf. Definition 5), we know
that Df(sk),0µ ≈s D˜f(sk),0µ , and thus, using again a hybrid argument on the number of KDM
queries, we obtain that G4.5 ≈s G5. This concludes the proof.
Claim 6. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν5,6 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G5 = 1]− P [G6 = 1]| ≤ ν5,6(λ).
Proof of claim. The indistinguishability of the two games is due to the F-KDM-CPA security
of Π. In particular, assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p5,6(·) such that,
for infinitely many values of λ ∈ N, we have |P [G5 = 1]−P [G6 = 1]| ≥ 1/p5,6(λ). Consider the
following PPT adversary A′ attacking F-KDM-CPA security of Π.
• Receive pk from the challenger, sample (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′)
to A.
• Upon input a query f to the KDM oracle, forward f to the target KDM oracle re-
ceiving back a ciphertext c, that is computed using fresh coins r←$R; compute c′ =
Enc(pk , 0µ; r′) using fresh coins r′←$R, run (c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), (pk , pk ′, sk ′, r′, 0µ)),
simulate the proof pi←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′)), and return c˜∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Upon input a query c∗ = (c, c′, pi) to the decryption oracle, answer this query as in both
G5 and G6 (i.e., decrypt c
′ using sk ′ after verifying the proof pi).
• Return the same guess as that of A.
Depending on A′’s target KDM oracle being initialized with hidden bit b = 1 or b = 0, we obtain
exactly the same distribution as in game G5 or G6. Thus, the above simulation is perfect and
A′ retains the same advantage as A. The claim follows.
Claim 7. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν6,7 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G6 = 1]− P [G7 = 1]| ≤ ν6,7(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between game G6 and G7 is that the latter game does
not run algorithm Rand in order to re-randomize the pair of ciphertexts (c, c′) within each
answer to KDM queries. Put differently, the pair (c, c′) corresponding to each ciphertext c∗
computed inside the KDM oracle is sampled from the distribution D0µ,0µ in game G7, while the
distribution D˜0µ,0µ is used in G6, where the distributions D and D˜ are defined in Eq. (2) and
Eq. (3). We use a hybrid argument, where we switch the answer to KDM queries one by one.
By the randomness fusion property of the PKE scheme (cf. Definition 5), we known that D0µ,0µ
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and D˜0µ,0µ are statistically close, and so must be each pair of adjecent hybrids, and therefore
also G6 and G7.
Claim 8. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν7,8 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G7 = 1]− P [G8 = 1]| ≤ ν7,8(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between game G7 and G8 is that the ciphertexts returned
by the KDM oracle contain proofs pi that are computed by running the real prover (with
witness (0µ, r∗)) in the latter game, while the zero-knowledge simulator is used in the former
game. Moreover, in game G8 the queries to the random oracle are evaluated by running H(·).
Thus, the claim follows readily from the non-interactive zero-knowledge property of (PH ,VH)
(cf. Definition 3).
Claim 9. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν8,9 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G8 = 1]− P [G9 = 1]| ≤ ν8,9(λ).
Proof of claim. The proof is down to the simulation soundness property of the NIZK.4 Define
the following event E in the probability space of game G9: The event occurs whenever there
exists a decryption query c∗i = (ci, c
′
i, pi
′
i) such that pi
′
i is accepting but Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i).
The distributions of G8 and G9 are identical conditioned on event E not happening. Hence,
by a standard argument, it suffices to bound the probability that event E occurs.
Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p8,9(·), such that, for infinitely
many values of λ ∈ N, adversary A provokes event E (in game G9) with probability at least
1/p8,9(λ). A PPT adversary A
′ is constructed, attacking simulation soundness of (PH ,VH), as
follows.
• Run (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) to A.
• Answer A’s queries to the KDM and decryption oracles as in game G9. This can be done
because the secret key sk is known to the reduction. Furthermore, the reduction can run
the real prover to obtain the proof pi, which is always for a true statement.
• Let (c1, c′1, pi1), . . . , (cq, c′q, piq) be the list of A’s decryption queries. Find an index i ∈ [q]
such that VH((pk , pk ′, ci, c′i), pii) = 1 and Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i); return ((pk , pk ′, ci,
c′i), pii).
Note that the simulation done by A′ is perfect. Thus, A will provoke event E with probability
1/p8,9(λ), and A
′ breaks simulation soundness with the same probability. This concludes the
proof of the claim.
Remark 1. While we did not write this explicitly, we stress that the KDM functions f ∈ F can
depend on the random oracle H. As originally argued in [FKMV12], this dependency does not
affect the above proof.
3.4 Main Theorem: Key-Leakage Security
As proven in [NS09, FKMV12] the classical Naor-Yung paradigm allows to boost CPA security
under Λ-key-leakage attacks to CCA security under Λ-key-leakage attacks. A similar result
holds for our twist of the Naor-Yung construction, assuming the underlying PKE scheme meets
the randomness fusion property.
4Actually soundness is already sufficient for this step of the proof, i.e. the reduction below does not need to
make any oracle query to the zero-knowledge simulator.
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Game G0-9:
(pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ)
(pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ)
sk∗ = sk
b←$ {0, 1}
QdecQH ← ∅
(m0,m1)← AOdecsk∗ (·),OΛsk∗ (·)(pk∗)
r, r′←$R
c = Enc(pk ,m1; r) \G0-5
c = Enc(pk , m0 ; r) \G6-9
c′ = Enc(pk ′,m1; r) \G0,1
c′ = Enc(pk ′,m1; r′ ) \G2,3
c′ = Enc(pk ′, m0 ; r′) \G3-6
c′ = Enc(pk ′,m0; r ) \G7-9
aux = (pk , pk ′, sk , r,m1) \G2-4
aux = (pk , pk ′, sk , r, m0 ) \G5-6
(c, c′)←$ Rand((c, c′), aux) \G2-6
pi←$ PH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), r) \G0,8,9
(pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c, c′)) \G1-7
c∗b = (c, c
′, pi)
b′ ← AOdecsk∗ (·)(c∗b)
Return (b′ = b) ∧ (c∗b 6∈ Qdec)
Oracle Odecsk∗(c∗):
If VH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), pi) = 0
Return ⊥
Else
Return Dec(sk , c) \G0-3,9
Return Dec(sk ′, c′) \G4-8
Qdec ← Qdec ∪ {c∗}
Oracle OΛsk∗(f):
Return f(sk∗)
Oracle OH(x):
If (x, ·) 6∈ QH
h←$R \G0,8,9
(h, τ)←$ S(1, τ, x) \G1-7
QH ← QH ∪ {(x, h)}
Return h
Else
Return h
Figure 5: Games in the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Main theorem, key-leakage security). Let Π be a PKE scheme satisfying Λ-LKG-
CPA security and with the randomness fusion property (cf. Definition 5), and let (PH ,VH) be a
simulation-sound NIZK for the language LΠNY of Eq. (1). Then, the PKE scheme Π
∗ described
in Fig. 3 satisfies Λ-LKG-CCA security in the random oracle model.
Proof. We consider a series of games, depicted in Fig. 5, where the initial game is identical to
the LKG-CCA experiment with hidden bit b = 1 and the last game is identical to the LKG-CCA
experiment with b = 0. As we show, their outcomes cannot be mutually distinguished, as long
as the theorem’s hypothesis are not violated.
Game G0: This game is identical to the LKG-CCA security experiment for Π
∗, with hidden
bit b = 1. In particular, the challenge ciphertext c1 := (c, c
′, pi) contains encryptions c and
c′ of the plaintext m1. The oracle Odecsk∗(·), upon input a ciphertext c∗ := (c, c′, pi), first
checks that VH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), pi) = 1; hence, it returns the same as Dec(sk , c).
Game G1: We change the way the challenge ciphertext is computed. In particular, the
proof pi is now obtained by running the zero-knowledge simulator, as in (pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ,
(pk , pk ′, c, c′)). Furthermore, random oracle queries are answered thrugh the algorithm
S(1, τ, ·).
Game G2: We change the way the challenge ciphertext is computed. In particular, instead
of computing c and c′ using the same randomness r∗←$R, we now sample r, r′←$R,
let c = Enc(pk ,m1; r), c
′ = Enc(pk ′,m1; r′), and finally re-randomize (c, c′) by running
Rand((c, c′), aux), with aux = (pk , pk ′, sk , r,m1). Note that, since the two ciphertexts use
independent randomness, the attached simulated proof pi is a proof of a false statement.
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Game G3: We change the way the challenge ciphertext is computed. In particular, the cipher-
text c′ is now computed as c′ = Enc(pk ′,m0; r′). Note that algorithm Rand always takes
a single secret key as input, and this will be important while arguing indistinguishability
with the previous game.
Game G4: We change the way decryption queries are answered. In particular, upon input a
decryption query c∗ := (c, c′, pi), we verify the proof pi (as before) but return Dec(sk′, c′)
in case the proof is accepting.
Game G5: We change the way the challenge ciphertext is computed. In particular, the auxil-
iary information used by algorithm Rand is changed to aux = (pk, pk′, sk′, r′,m0).
Game G6: We change the way the challenge ciphertext is computed. In particular, the cipher-
tex c is obtained as an encryption of m0, i.e., c = Enc(pk ,m0; r) for r←$R.
Game G7: We change the way the challenge ciphertext is computed. In particular, we do not
run algorithm Rand anymore. This means that ciphertexts c and c′ are now computed
again using the same random coins r∗←$R, and thus the proof pi is for a true statement.
Game G8: We change the way the challenge ciphertext is computed. In particular, the proof pi
is now obtained by running the real prover algorithm, as in pi←$ PH((pk , pk ′, c′, c′), (m0,
r∗)). Furthermore, random oracle queries are answered using the random oracle H.
Game G9: We change the way decryption queries are answered. In particular, we now return
Dec(sk , c) (as long as the proof pi is accepting). This yields a distribution identical to the
one of the LKG-CCA security experiment for Π∗, with hidden bit b = 0.
Next, we proceed to show indistinguishability of the above defined games.
Claim 10. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν0,1 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G0 = 1]− P [G1 = 1]| ≤ ν0,1(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between G0 and G1 is that the challenge ciphertext contains
a proof pi that is computed by running the real prover (with witness (m1, r
∗)) in the former
game, while the zero-knowledge simulator is used in the latter game. Moreover, in game G1 the
queries to the random oracle are simulated by running S(1, τ, ·). Thus, the claim follows readily
from the non-interactive zero-knowledge property of (PH ,VH) (cf. Definition 3).
Claim 11. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν1,2 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G1 = 1]− P [G2 = 1]| ≤ ν1,2(λ).
Proof of claim. Game G2 is identical to G1, except that in the former algorithm Rand is run
to re-randomize the pair of ciphertexts (c, c′). Put differently, the pair (c, c′) is sampled from
the distribution Dm1,m1 in game G1, while the distribution D˜m1,m1 is used in G2, where the
distributions D and D˜ are defined in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). By the randomness fusion property
of the PKE scheme (cf. Definition 5), we known that Dm1,m1 and D˜m1,m1 are statistically close,
and so must be G1 and G2.
Claim 12. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν2,3 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G2 = 1]− P [G3 = 1]| ≤ ν2,3(λ).
Proof of claim. Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p2,3(·) such that, for
infinitely many values of λ ∈ N, we have |P [G2 = 1]− P [G3 = 1]| ≥ 1/p2,3(λ). We construct a
PPT adversary A′ breaking CPA security (and thus 0-LKG-CPA security) of Π, as follows.
• Receive pk ′ from the challenger, sample (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′)
to A.
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• Upon input a query f to the leakage oracle, answer with f(sk); this can be done as A′
knows the secret key sk .
• When A outputs m0 and m1, forward (m0,m1) to the challenger obtaining a ciphertext
c′ (which is either an encryption of m1 or an encryption of m0 under pk ′, using fresh
coins r′←$R). Hence, compute c = Enc(pk ,m1; r) using fresh random coins r←$R, run
(c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), (pk , pk ′, sk , r,m1)), simulate the proof pi←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′)),
and return c˜∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Upon input a query c∗ = (c, c′, pi) to the decryption oracle, answer this query as in both
G2 and G3 (i.e., decrypt c using sk after verifying the proof pi).
• Return the same guess as that of A.
Depending on A′’s challenger using hidden bit b = 1 or b = 0, we obtain exactly the same
distribution as in game G2 or G3. As a consequence, the above simulation is perfect and A
′
retains the same advantage as A. The claim follows.
Claim 13. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν3,4 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G3 = 1]− P [G4 = 1]| ≤ ν3,4(λ).
Proof of claim. Notice that G3 and G4 use a different decryption procedure; in particular,
decryption queries are answered using the secret key sk in the former game, while sk ′ is used in
the latter game. The proof is down to the simulation soundness property of the NIZK. Consider
the following event, defined over the probability space of game G4: The event E becomes
true whenever there exists a decryption query c∗i = (ci, c
′
i, pi
′
i) such that pi
′
i is accepting but
Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i). Notice that the distributions of G3 and G4 are identical conditioned
on event E not happening, hence, by a standard argument, it suffices to bound the probability
that event E happens.
Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p3,4(·) such that, for infinitely
many values of λ ∈ N, adversary A provokes event E (in game G4) with probability at least
1/p3,4(λ). We construct a PPT adversary A
′ attacking simulation soundness of (PH ,VH), as
follows.
• Run (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) to A.
• Upon input a leakage query f , answer with f(sk); this can be done as A′ knows the secret
key sk .
• When A ouputs (m0,m1) compute the pair of ciphertexts (c˜, c˜′) as in game G4, i.e. let
c = Enc(pk ,m1; r), c
′ = Enc(pk ′,m0; r′), and (c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), aux). Hence, forward
the statement (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′) to the target simulation oracle obtaining a proof pi, and return
c∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Answer A’s queries to the decryption oracle as in game G4; this can be done because the
secret key sk ′ is known to the reduction.
• Let (c1, c′1, pi1), . . . , (cq, c′q, piq) be the list of A’s decryption queries. Find an index i ∈ [q]
such that VS(1,τ,·)((pk , pk ′, ci, c′i), pii) = 1 and Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i); return ((pk , pk ′, ci,
c′i), pii).
Notice that the simulation done by A′ is perfect. Thus, A will provoke event E with probability
1/p3,4(λ), and A
′ breaks simulation soundness with the same probability. This concludes the
proof of the claim.
Claim 14. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν4,5 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G4 = 1]− P [G5 = 1]| ≤ ν4,5(λ).
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Proof of claim. Game G4 and G5 differ on the auxiliary information provided to the algorithm
Rand. Define the hybrid game G4.5, where instead of running algorithm Rand the ciphertexts
(c, c′) corresponding to the challenge ciphertext are sampled from the distribution D˜m1,m0 of
Eq. (3). By the randomness fusion property is obtained G4 ≈s G4.5 ≈s G5, which implies the
claim.
Claim 15. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν5,6 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G5 = 1]− P [G6 = 1]| ≤ ν5,6(λ).
Proof of claim. The indistinguishability of the two games is down to the Λ-LKG-CPA security
of Π. In particular, assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p5,6(·) such that,
for infinitely many values of λ ∈ N, we have |P [G5 = 1]−P [G6 = 1]| ≥ 1/p5,6(λ). Consider the
following PPT adversary A′ attacking Λ-KDM-CPA security of Π.
• Receive pk from the challenger, sample (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′)
to A.
• Upon input a query f to the leakage oracle, forward f to the target leakage oracle and
return the corresponding output to A.
• Whenever A outputs (m0,m1), forward (m0,m1) to the challenger obtaining a ciphertext c
(which is either an encryption ofm0 or an encryption ofm1 under public key pk , using fresh
random coins r←$R). Hence, compute c′ = Enc(pk ,m0; r′) using fresh coins r′←$R, run
(c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), (pk , pk ′, sk ′, r′,m0)), simulate the proof pi←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′)),
and return c˜∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Upon input a query c∗ = (c, c′, pi) to the decryption oracle, answer this query as in both
G5 and G6 (i.e., decrypt c
′ using sk ′ after verifying the proof pi).
• Return the same guess as that of A.
Depending on A′’s challenger using hidden bit b = 1 or b = 0, we obtain exactly the same
distribution as in game G5 or G6. Thus, the above simulation is perfect and A
′ retains the
same advantage as A. The claim follows.
Claim 16. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν6,7 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G6 = 1]− P [G7 = 1]| ≤ ν6,7(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between G6 and G7 is that the latter game does not run
algorithm Rand in order to re-randomize the pair of ciphertexts (c, c′) within the challenge
ciphertext. Put differently, the pair (c, c′) is sampled from the distribution Dm0,m0 in game
G7 and from the distribution D˜m0,m0 in G6, where the distributions D and D˜ are defined in
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). By the randomness fusion property of the PKE scheme (cf. Definition 5),
we known that Dm0,m0 and D˜m0,m0 are statistically close, and so must be G6 and G7.
Claim 17. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν7,8 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G7 = 1]− P [G8 = 1]| ≤ ν7,8(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between game G7 and G8 is that the proof pi corresponding
to the challenge ciphertext is computed by running the real prover (with witness (m0, r
∗)) in
the former game, while the zero-knowledge simulator is used in G7. Moreover, in game G8 the
queries to the random oracle are evaluated by running H(·). Thus, the claim follows readily
from the non-interactive zero-knowledge property of (PH ,VH) (cf. Definition 3).
Claim 18. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν8,9 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G8 = 1]− P [G9 = 1]| ≤ ν8,9(λ).
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Proof of claim. The proof is down to the simulation soundness property of the NIZK. Define
the following event E in the probability space of game G9: The event occours whenever there
exists a decryption query c∗i = (ci, c
′
i, pi
′
i) such that pi
′
i is accepting but Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i).
The distributions of G8 and G9 are identical conditioned on event E not happening. Hence,
by a standard argument, it suffices to bound the probability that event E happens.
Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p8,9(·) such that, for infinitely
many values of λ ∈ N, adversary A provokes event E (in game G9) with probability at least
1/p8,9(λ). We construct a PPT adversary A
′ attacking simulation soundness of (PH ,VH), as
follows.
• Run (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) to A.
• Upon input a leakage query f from A, answer with f(sk); this can be done as A′ knows
the secret key sk .
• Whenever A outputs (m0,m1), compute the challenge ciphertext c∗ = (c, c′, pi) as in G9;
this can be done as A′ can run the real prover to obtain the proof pi, which is always for
a true statement.
• Let (c1, c′1, pi1), . . . , (cq, c′q, piq) be the list of A’s decryption queries. Find an index i ∈ [q]
such that VH((pk , pk ′, ci, c′i), pii) = 1 and Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i); return ((pk , pk ′, ci,
c′i), pii).
Note that the simulation done by A′ is perfect. Thus, A will provoke event E with probability
1/p8,9(λ) and A
′ breaks simulation soundness with the same probability. This concludes the
proof of the claim.
Remark 2. While we did not write this explicitly, we stress that in the above proof the leakage
functions can depend on the random oracle H. See also Remark 1.
4 KDM Security from Subset Sum
We start by recalling the Subset Sum assumption in Section 4.1. Our new Subset-Sum based
PKE scheme is described in Section 4.2, and its correctness and security are showed in Section 4.3
and Section 4.4, respectively.
4.1 The Subset Sum Problem
In its simplest form, the search version of the Subset Sum problem—denoted SS(n, q) and
parameterized by values n(λ), q(λ) ∈ N—asks to compute a secret vector s given (a, t) such
that t := 〈a, s〉 mod q, where both a ∈ Znq and s ∈ {0, 1}n are randomly chosen. The decisional
version of the problem, instead, asks to distinguish (a, t) from (a, u) where u is uniform in Zq.
The equivalence between the search and the decisional version of the Subset Sum problem has
been established in a seminal paper by Impagliazzo and Naor [IN96].
Below, we recall a variant of the Subset Sum problem which was considered for the first
time by Lyubashevsky, Palacio and Segev [LPS10]. Here the modulus q is a power of an odd
number; in our case we will set q := pm, for some m ∈ N. Such a variant of the problem helps
interpreting the Subset Sum problem as an instance of the Learning with Errors [Reg05, Reg09]
(LWE) problem with “deterministic noise”, as we recall below.
Definition 6 (Subset Sum assumption). For security parameter λ ∈ N, and parameters n(λ),
p(λ), m(λ) ∈ N, consider the following distribution DSS(λ, n, p,m):
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• Sample A←$ Zm×np and s←$ {0, 1}n.
• Parse A := (a1,1, . . . , am,n), s := (s1, . . . , sn), compute A · s ∈ Znp , and let e1(A, s) := 0.
For all j ∈ [m], j 6= 1, compute
ej(A, s) :=
⌊
ej−1(A, s) +
∑n
i=1 si · aj−1,i
p
⌋
mod p.
• Set e(A, s) := (em(A, s), . . . , e1(A, s))T and t := A · s + e(A, s). Output (A, t, s).
We say that the decisional Subset Sum assumption SS(n, pm) holds, if for all PPT distinguishers
D there exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that∣∣P [D(A, t) = 1 : (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m)]
− P [D(A,u) = 1 : (A,u)←$ Zm×np × Zmp ]∣∣ ≤ ν(λ).
It can be shown that the above decisional version of Subset Sum is equivalent to the search
version (i.e., to finding s). In fact, [LPS10] showed that the representation (A, t) ∈ Zm×np ×Zmp
of Subset Sum is equivalent to the original representation (a, t) ∈ Znq ×Zq, whenever q = pm and
p ≥ 2√n log n+ 3. In particular, given a := (a1, . . . , an) and s := (s1, . . . , sn), the matrix A :=
(a1,1, . . . , am,n) can be defined as follows. For i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], let aj,i := b aipj−1 c mod p, and
interpret the vector e(A, s) as the vector of carries in the computation of t :=
∑n
i=1 si·ai mod pm.
This way, the value t directly corresponds to n∑
i=1
si
am,i...
a1,i

+
em(A, s)...
e0(A, s)
 = t,
as desired.
Therefore, Subset Sum can be seen as LWE with deterministic noise e(A, s) which only
depends on A and s. An important difference between Subset Sum and LWE is that for LWE
the value m can be arbitrarily large as long as it remains polynomial. Instead, for Subset Sum
the density δ := n/ log q = n/(m log p) decreases with the size of m; this implies that Subset
Sum can be solved efficiently for m ≈ n2. However, the problem is considered to be hard
whenever δ ∈ O(1/ log n).
The following lemma, which can be easily derived from [LPS10, Lemma 3.4], states that
the deterministic noise e(A, s) is small, and additionally it remains small when multiplied by a
matrix R with components of bounded size.
Lemma 1 ([LPS10]). For security parameter λ ∈ N, and parameters n(λ), p(λ), m(λ), `(λ) ∈
N, let `,m ∈ poly(λ) and p be a prime such that p ≥ 2√n log n+3. Let (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m)
and R←$ [−b√p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m. There exist negligible functions ν, ν ′ : N→ [0, 1] such that
P
[‖e(A, s)‖∞ < √n log n+ 1] ≥ 1− ν(λ)
P
[‖R · e(A, s)‖∞ < √pmn log2 n+ n√p] ≥ 1− ν ′(λ). (4)
Leftover hash lemma. Let H := {h : D → I} be a family of hash functions with domain D
and image I. Recall that H is called universal if for any x ∈ D and x′ ∈ D the following holds:
P
h←$H
[
h(x) = h(x′)
]
=
1
|I| .
20
The celebrated leftover hash lemma [HILL99, AP11] states that, over a random choice of
h←$H, x←$D, and u←$ I, the statistical distance between (h, h(x)) and (h, u) is smaller
than 1/2
√|I|/|D|.
It is easy to show that matrices in Zm×np are a family of universal hash functions for prime
p and any domain D ⊆ Zmp . As a consequence, we obtain the following lemma which will be
important for showing security of our PKE scheme.
Lemma 2. For prime p and values n,m, ` ∈ N, let A←$ Zm×np , u1,u2←$ Zmp , R←$ [−b
√
p/2c,
b√p/2c]`×m, and B←$ Z`×(n+2)p . Then,
∆ ((A,u1,u2,RA,Ru1,Ru2); (A,u1,u2,B)) ≤ `
2
4
√
22(n+2) log p−m log(p−2).
Proof. SinceH := Zm×(n+2)p is a family of universal hash functions with domain D := [−b√p/2c,
b√p/2c]m and image I := Zn+2p , the statement follows directly by the leftover hash lemma and
the triangle inequality (via a standard hybrid argument).
4.2 Scheme Description
We now describe a PKE scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec), with message space M = {0, 1}` for an
arbitrary polynomial `(·). The scheme depends on the Subset Sum distribution of Definition 6,
with parameters n, p, m ∈ N.
Key Generation: Upon input the security parameter λ ∈ N, the randomized key generation
algorithm Gen samples (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m) and defines pk := (A, t) and sk := s.
Encryption: Upon input a plaintext M ∈ {0, 1}` and the public key pk := (A, t), the ran-
domized encryption algorithm Enc picks a random matrix R←$ [−b√p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m
and returns C := (A′, t′ + m · bp2c) such that A′ := R ·A, t′ := R · t, and m ∈ Z`2 is the
vector representation of the plaintext M ∈ {0, 1}`.
Decryption: Upon input the secret key sk := s and a ciphertext C := (C1, c2), the determin-
istic decryption algorithm Dec returns bc2 −C1 · se2 ∈ {0, 1}`.
4.3 Proof of Correctness
The theorem below states that the above defined PKE scheme meets the correctness require-
ment, i.e. decryption of honestly computed ciphertexts yields the corresponding plaintext.
Theorem 3 (Correctness of PKE scheme). Let n, p, q ∈ N be parameters such that p is a prime,
p ≥ 25mn log4 n, n ≥ 10, m ∈ Θ(n), and ` ∈ O(nk) for some constant k ∈ N. Then, the PKE
scheme of Section 4.2 satisfies correctness.
Further, correctness holds for ciphertexts of the form C := (A′, t′ + m ◦ bξ/2c), for any
vector ξ ∈ [p− n− 1, p]`, and where ◦ denotes the Hadamard product.
Proof. We prove directly the second part of the statement, as it implies the first part. The
decryption algorithm computes
bc2 −C1 · se2 = bt′ + m ◦ bξ/2c −A′ · se2 = bR · t + m ◦ bξ/2c −R ·A · se2
= bR(A · s + e(A, s)) + m ◦ bξ/2c −R ·A · se2
= bR · e(A, s) + m ◦ bξ/2ce2,
where the third equality comes from the definition of the Subset Sum distribution. Finally, for
parameters m,n, p as in the theorem statement, by using the bound of Eq. (4) from Lemma 1,
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with overwhelming probability over the choice of pk , sk ,R, we obtain that ‖R · e(A, s)‖∞ is
smaller than
√
pmn log2 n+ n
√
p. By choosing p ≥ 25mn log4 n and n ≥ 10,
‖R · e(A, s)‖∞ < bp/4c − b(n+ 1)/2 + 1c ≤ bp/4c − ‖bξ′/2 + 1c‖∞
holds for ξ′ ∈ [0, n+ 1]`, and thus
bR · e(A, s) + m ◦ bξ/2ce2 = b(R · e(A, s)−m ◦ bξ′/2 + 1c+ mbp/2c)bp/2c−1e
= b(R · e(A, s)−m ◦ bξ′/2 + 1c) · bp/2c−1e+ bme = m.
4.4 Proof of Security
We now prove that our PKE scheme satisfies a form of KDM security, as formalized in the
theorem below. The set of manipulations tolerated by the scheme consists of the set of all affine
functions of the form
Faff := {f : f(s) := F · s + f}F∈Z`×n2 ,f∈Z`2 .
We remark that a generic amplification theorem by Applebaum [App11, App14] allows to boost
Faff -KDM-CPA security to G-KDM-CPA security, where G consists of the family of functions
that can computed in some fixed polynomial time (or the set of all polynomial-size circuits
whose size grows with their input and output lengths via a fixed polynomial rate).
For technical reasons, we need that when encrypting a function of the secret key, the ci-
phertext has a slightly different form. Namely, c′2 := t′ +
(
F · ⌊p2⌋) · s + bp2c · f instead of
c2 := t
′+(F ·s+ f)bp2c. This can be easily done by the encryption algorithm whenever F, f and
s are known. Furthermore, c′2 and c2 decrypt to the same value. This can be seen by noticing
that bp2c = p−12 , the multiplication with s and addition with f is for each component the sum of
at most n+ 1 values p−12 modulo p, and hence c
′
2 is a ciphertext of the form c
′
2 = t
′ + bξ2c ◦m
for some ξ ∈ [p− n− 1, p]` (cf. Theorem 3).
The reason for this obstacle is that we need to map the function f , which lives in Z2, into Zp.
Since p is prime, it does not have a subgroup of size 2 to which we could map the components
of F and f . Therefore we need to map them to either p−12 (when 1) or to 0 (when 0). Since
we do not map them to a subgroup, the output of f will also not be in a subgroup, but within
range [p−n−1, p] (when 1) or [−n−1, 0] (when 0). One could resolve this obstacle by choosing
p even, but then the leftover-hash lemma does only apply for a matrix R with components in
{0, 1}, such that m needs to be larger. This would decrease the density of the underlying Subset
Sum instance to 1/ log2(n). Therefore, we prefer our approach.
Theorem 4 (KDM security of PKE scheme). Let n, p, q ∈ N be parameters such that p is a
prime, p ≥ 25mn log4 n, m ∈ Θ(n), and ` ∈ O(nk) for some constant k ∈ N. If the SS(n, pm)
assumption holds (achieved with density δ ∈ Θ(1/ log n)), then the PKE scheme Π from Sec-
tion 4.2 satisfies Faff-KDM-CPA security.
Proof. We consider a series of games, where the initial game is identical to the KDM-CPA
experiment with hidden bit b = 1 and the last game is identical to the KDM-CPA experiment
with b = 0. Hence, we show that the games are computationally indistinguishable unless one of
the assumptions in the theorem statement is violated. This implies the theorem.
Game G0: This game is identical to the KDM-CPA experiment for the PKE scheme Π of
Section 4.2, with hidden bit b = 1. In particular, this means that the adversary has
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access to oracle Okdms,1 (·) which, upon input a query (F, f) ∈ Faff , returns a ciphertext
C = (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A c2 := R · t +
(
F ·
⌊p
2
⌋)
· s +
⌊p
2
⌋
· f ,
where R←$ [−b√p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m, and (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m).
Game G1: We change the way queries to the KDM oracle are answered. Namely, upon input
a query (F, f) ∈ Faff , we now return a ciphertext C := (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c2 := R · t + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
.
Game G2: We change the distribution of the public key. Namely, instead of having sk = s
and pk = (A, t) where (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m), we now have sk = s and pk = (A,u)
where (A,u)←$ Zm×np ×Zmp and (as before) s←$ {0, 1}n. Queries to the KDM oracle are
answered as in the previous game. Namely, upon input a query (F, f) ∈ Faff , we now
return a ciphertext C := (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c2 := R · u + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
.
Game G3: This game is identical to the KDM-CPA experiment for the PKE scheme Π of
Section 4.2, with hidden bit b = 0. In particular, this means that the adversary has
access to oracle Okdms,0 (·) which, upon input a query (F, f) ∈ Faff , returns a ciphertext
C = (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A c2 := R · t,
where R←$ [−b√p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m, and (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m).
Next, we proceed to show indistinguishability of the above defined games.
Claim 19. G0 ≈s G1.
Proof of claim. The proof is a consequence of leftover-hash lemma (cf. Lemma 2). In fact,
basing on that lemma, for C = (C1, c2) computed by G0 with
C1 := R ·A c2 := R · t +
(
F ·
⌊p
2
⌋)
· s + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
,
and C ′ = (C′1, c′2) computed by G1 where
C′1 := R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c′2 := R · t + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
,
we have that there exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that
∆ ((C1,Re(A, s)); (U,Re(A, s))) ≤ ν(λ) and ∆
(
(C′1,Re(A, s)); (U,Re(A, s))
) ≤ ν(λ),
where U←$ Z`×np . Conditioned on C1, C′1, Re(A, s), both c2 and c′2 are uniquely determined:
c2 = C1s + Re(A, s) +
(
F ·
⌊p
2
⌋)
· s + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c′2 = C
′
1s + Re(A, s) +
(
F ·
⌊p
2
⌋)
· s + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
.
Therefore c2 and c
′
2 have the same distribution and we obtain that
∆((C1, c2), (C
′
1, c
′
2)) ≤ 2ν(λ),
so G0 and G1 are indistinguishable.
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Claim 20. For all PPT distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function ν1,2 : N→ [0, 1] such
that |P [D(G1(λ)) = 1]− P [D(G2(λ)) = 1]| ≤ ν1,2(λ).
Proof of claim. Assume there exists a PPT distinguisher D and a polynomial p1,2(·), such that,
for infinitely many values of λ ∈ N, distinguisher D tells apart G1 and G2 with probability at
least 1/p1,2(λ). We build a PPT distinguisher D
′ that breaks the Subset Sum assumption with
the same probability, i.e. D′ is given a pair (A, t) as input and is able to distinguish whether this
pair was sampled from the Subset Sum distribution DSS(λ, n, p,m) or uniformly at random. A
complete description of D′(A, t) follows below.
• Set pk := (A, t), and forward pk to D.
• Upon input a query (F, f) to the KDM oracle from D, answer this query as it would be
done both in G1 and G2. Namely, let C1 := R ·A + Fbp/2c, c2 := R · t + fbp/2c, and
return C = (C1, c2) to D. Note that this is possible because in both games the answer to
KDM queries can be generated without knowing the secret key.
• Return the guess of D.
For the analysis, note that D′ perfectly simulates the view of D. In fact, depending on the
public key being Subset Sum distributed or uniformly distributed, the view of D′ is identical to
either the view in G1 or the view in G2. Thus, D
′ retains the same advantage of D, concluding
the proof.
Claim 21. For all PPT distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function ν2,3 : N→ [0, 1] such
that |P [D(G2(λ)) = 1]− P [D(G3(λ)) = 1]| ≤ ν2,3(λ).
Proof of claim. The proof of indistinguishability between G2 and G3 follows from the leftover-
hash lemma (cf. Lemma 2) and the Subset Sum assumption. Game G2 computes ciphertexts
C = (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c2 := R · u + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
,
whereas G3 computes C
′ = (C′1, c′2) with
C′1 := R ·A c′2 := R · t.
By Lemma 2 we have that there exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that
∆ ((C1,Ru); (U,Ru)) ≤ ν(λ) and ∆
(
(C′1,Ru); (U,Ru)
) ≤ ν(λ),
where U←$ Z`×np and u←$ Zmp . Furthermore, the components F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
and f · ⌊p2⌋—where
F ∈ Z`×np and f ∈ Z`p—represent only a translation for C1 and c2, so we have:
C1 = R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
≈s R ·A = C′1 c2 = R · u + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
≈s R · u.
Therefore, the indistinguishability between the distributions (C1, c2) and (C
′
1, c
′
2) follows from
those approximations and the Subset Sum assumption, whereby ((R · A), (R · u)) ≈c ((R ·
A), (R · t)), which implies the statement.
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5 Concrete Instantiations and Comparisons
In this section we showcase the efficiency improvement due to the adoption of our twist of
the Naor-Yung paradigm, when we instantiate the (ROM based) NIZK in the corresponding
language using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] applied to so-called Sigma-protocols.
Sigma-protocols. Let L be an NP language, with corresponding relation R, and let (P,V)
be an interactive argument system for L. We say that Σ = (P,V) is a Sigma-protocol if its
transcripts consist of three messages (α, β, γ), with the first message sent by the prover, and
with β being the random coin tosses of the verifier. Typically, a Sigma-protocol satisfies the
following properties.
Completeness: Transcripts (α, β, γ) generated by a honest prover are accepted by the verifier
with overwhelming probability.
Special Soundness: Given two accepting transcripts (α, β, γ) and (α, β′, γ′) for a given state-
ment y ∈ L, with β 6= β′, it is possible to extract in polynomial time a value x such that
(y, x) ∈ R.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: There exists a PPT simulator that, upon input some
y ∈ L, outputs transcripts (α, β, γ) that are computationally indistinguishable from honest
transcripts resulting from interactions between P and V on common input y.
The Fiat-Shamir heuristic transforms a Sigma-protocol with the above properties into a NIZK
argument system, using a hash function H modeled as a random oracle; the main idea is that
the prover emulates the verifier by setting β := H(α||y). As proven in [FKMV12, Theorem
2], the above transformation yields a simulation-sound NIZK in the random oracle model,
provided that Σ satisfies an additional property known as “quasi-unique responses” (a.k.a.
strict soundness [Unr12]): No PPT adversary should be able to output a statement y ∈ L
together with two accepting proofs (α, β, γ) and (α, β, γ′), such that γ 6= γ′.
Evaluation. Summarizing the above discussion, to instantiate the NIZK argument in our
twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm in the random oracle model, it suffices to give a Sigma-protocol
with the properties discussed above, for the language defined in Eq. (1).
Table 1 compares two instantiations of our scheme w.r.t. the original Naor-Yung paradigm,
based on two different complexity assumptions: Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Quadratic
Residuosity (QR). We make the comparison for both cases of CCA security under key-dependent
message and key-leakage attacks. The description of the corresponding Sigma-protocols can be
found in the following subsections, where we additionally describe an instantiation based on
Subset Sum using our PKE scheme from Section 4.
PKE Scheme Security Standard NY Ours Assumption
BHHO08 [BHHO08] KDM/LKG 4`+ 5 2`+ 4 DDH
BG10 [BG10] KDM/LKG 4`+ 5 2`+ 4 QR
Table 1: Comparing two instantiations of our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm under the DDH
and QR assumptions. KDM and LKG stand for CCA security under key-dependent message and key-
leakage attacks, respectively. The third and forth columns contain the ciphertext size expressed in group
elements or exponents, for the standard Naor-Yung construction and our modified version (respectively).
All instantiations are in the random oracle model.
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5.1 Instantiantion from Decisional Diffie-Hellman
5.1.1 The PKE Scheme of Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg, and Ostrovsky
We recall the PKE scheme put forward by Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg, and Ostrovsky [BHHO08]
(BHHO in what follows). Let G be a group of prime-order q. For randomly selected generators
g1, . . . , g`←$G, define params := (G, g1, . . . , g`, q). The public key is pk := h :=
∏`
i=i g
zi
i
for a secret key sk := (z1, ..., z`) ∈ Z`q. Given the public parameters params and a message
m ∈ G, the encryption algorithm samples a random r←$ Zq and outputs c = (c1, ..., c`+1) =
(gr1, . . . , g
r
` ,m · hr).
Note that, by setting ` = 1, the BHHO PKE scheme is identical to ElGamal [ElG85], which
is CPA-secure under the DDH assumption in G. [BHHO08] showed that, for ` = d3 log qe, the
scheme is Faff -KDM-CPA secure under the DDH assumption, where the set Faff consists of all
affine functions over the secret key space. Naor and Segev [NS09] additionally prove that, for
` = 2 + Λ+ω(log λ)log q , the same PKE scheme is CPA-secure under Λ-key-leakage attacks.
On randomness fusion. Consider the following PPT algorithm Rand, taking as input a pair
of ciphertexts (c, c′) such that c := (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · hr) and c′ := (gr
′
1 , . . . , g
r′
` ,m
′ · (h′)r′), and the
auxiliary information aux := (h, h′, (z′1, . . . , z′`), r
′,m′). The algorithm performs the following
steps, where all operations are performed in the group G:
(i) For each i ∈ [`], define c˜i := ci · c′i;
(ii) Compute c˜`+1 := c`+1 · hr′ ;
(iii) Compute c˜′`+1 := c
′
`+1 ·
∏`
i=1 c
z′i
i ;
(iv) Return c˜ = (c˜1, . . . , c˜`, c˜`+1) and c˜
′ = (c˜1, . . . , c˜`, c˜′`+1).
One can easily see that the pair of ciphertexts returned by Rand is perfectly distributed to a
pair of BHHO encryptions with common (uniform) randomness r∗ := r + r′ mod q. For i ∈ [`],
c˜i = ci · c′i = gr+r
′
i , c˜`+1 = c`+1 · hr
′
= m · hr+r′ and
c˜′`+1 = c
′
`+1 ·
∏`
i=1
c
z′i
i = m
′ · hr′ ·
(∏`
i=1
g
z′i
i
)r
= m′ · hr+r′ .
5.1.2 The Protocol
In order to instantiate our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm with the BHHO PKE scheme, we
need to construct a Sigma-protocol for the following language:
LBHHONY = {(h, h′, c, c′) : ∃r ∈ Zq,m ∈ G s.t. c = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · hr), c′ = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · (h′)r)},
where c := (c1, ..., c`, c`+1) and c
′ := (c1, ..., c`, c′`+1) are BHHO encryptions with common
randomness r, using independent public keys pk := h and pk ′ := h′, and common public
parameters params = (G, g1, . . . , g`, q). The protocol Σ = (P,V) is described below:
• P chooses s←$ Zq and defines the commitment to be α := (α1, . . . , α`, α`+1) := (gs1, . . . ,
gs` , (h/h
′)s).
• V replies with a random β←$ Zq.
• P computes the response γ := s− βr.
• Given a transcript (α, β, γ) and some statement (h, h′, c, c′) the verifier accepts it if and
only if αi = g
γ
i · cβi (for all i ∈ [`]), and also α`+1 = (h/h′)γ · (c`+1/c′`+1)β.
Next, we argue that the above protocol meets the required properties.
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Completeness. Follows by inspection, as
gγi · cβi = gs−βri · cβi = gs−βri · gβri = gsi = αi
(h/h′)γ · (c`+1/c′`+1)β = (h/h′)s−βr · (h/h′)βr = (h/h′)s = α`+1.
Special soundness. Let (α, β, γ) and (α, β′, γ′) be two accepting transcripts for some y ∈
LBHHONY , such that β 6= β′. This means that, for all i ∈ [`], αi = gγi · cβi , and thus ci = gri for
r = (γ− γ′)(β′−β)−1. Note that for the same value of r is also holds that c`+1/c′`+1 = (h/h′)r,
and thus r is a valid witness for y ∈ LBHHONY .
HVZK. Consider the simulator that, upon input a statement y := (h, h′, (c1, . . . , c`+1), (c′1, . . . ,
c′`+1)), first samples β←$ Zq, γ←$ Zq, and then defines α = (α1, . . . , α`, α`+1) such that
αi := g
γ
i · cβi (for all i ∈ [`]) and α`+1 := (h/h′)γ · (c`+1/c′`+1)β. It is easy to see that the
above yields an identical distribution to the one of honest transcripts (α, β, γ).
Quasi-unique responses. Assume that, for y := (h, h′, (c1, . . . , c`+1), (c′1, . . . , c′`+1)) ∈ LBHHONY ,
there exist two accepting proofs (α, β, γ) and (α, β, γ′). This means in particular that (h/h′)γ =
(h/h′)γ′ , and thus γ ≡ γ′ (mod q).
5.2 Instantiation from Quadratic Residuosity
5.2.1 The PKE Scheme of Brakerski and Goldwasser
We recall the PKE encryption scheme put forward by Brakerski and Goldwasser [BG10] (BG
in what follows). Let GU = GM ×GL be a group such that GM is cyclic, and the orders of GM
and GL are relatively prime and denoted by M and L (respectively). For randomly selected
generators g1, . . . , g`←$GL, define params := (GU ,GM ,GL, g1, . . . , g`,M,L, T ) with T ≥M ·L.
The public key is pk := g0 :=
∏`
i=i g
−zi
i for a secret key sk := (z1, ..., z`) ∈ {0, 1}`. Given the
public parameters params and a message m ∈ GM , the encryption algorithm samples a random
r←$ [T 2] and outputs c = (c1, ..., c`+1) = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · gr0).
[BG10] showed that, for ` = logL + ω(log λ), the scheme is Faff -KDM-CPA secure under
the Subgroup Indistinguishability assumption,5 where the set Faff consists of all affine functions
over the secret key space. For ` = Λ + log(ML) + ω(log λ), the same PKE scheme is also
CPA-secure under Λ-key-leakage attacks.
On randomness fusion. The proof that the BG PKE scheme meets the randomness fusion
property of Definition 5 follows along the same lines of BHHO.
5.2.2 The Protocol
In order to instantiate our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm with the BG PKE scheme, we need
to construct a Sigma-protocol for the following language:
LBGNY = {(g0, g′0, c, c′) : ∃r ∈ [T 2],m ∈ GM s.t. c = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m ·gr0), c′ = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · (g′0)r)},
where c := (c1, ..., c`, c`+1) and c
′ := (c1, ..., c`, c′`+1) are BG encryptions with common random-
ness r, using independent public keys pk := g0 and pk
′ := g′0, and common public parameters
params = (GU ,GM ,GL, g1, . . . , g`,M,L, T ). The protocol Σ = (P,V) is described below:
5This assumption states that random elements from GU are computationally indistinguishable from random
elements from GL, and it includes the Quadratic Residuosity and Paillier’s Decisional Composite Residuosity
assumptions as a special case [BG10].
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• P chooses s←$ [T 2] and defines the commitment to be α := (α1, . . . , α`, α`+1) := (gs1, . . . ,
gs` , (g0/g
′
0)
s).
• V replies with a random β←$ [T 2].
• P computes the response γ := s− βr.
• Given a transcript (α, β, γ) and some statement (g0, g′0, c, c′), the verifier accepts it if and
only if αi = g
γ
i · cβi (for all i ∈ [`]), and also α`+1 = (g0/g′0)γ · (c`+1/c′`+1)β.
The proof that the above Sigma-protocol satisfies completeness, special soundness, HVZK, and
quasi-unique responses is similar to the case of BHHO and is therefore omitted.
5.3 Instantiation from Subset Sum
Next, we turn to our PKE scheme based on Subset Sum from Section 4.
On randomness fusion. We show that the scheme from Section 4 fulfills a slight variation
of the randomness fusion property of Definition 5. First, we need that both public keys use the
same component A. Since A is independent of the secret key, this is not an issue and therefore
A could be seen as a public parameter. Further, we need some leakage on the randomness R of
a ciphertext. Exploiting the leftover-hash lemma, it is easy to see that our PKE scheme from
Section 4 is still secure when for a ciphertext C1 = RA, c2 = R(As + e(A, s)) + mbp/2c the
value Re(A, s′) is leaked, as long as s′ is independent of s. By the leftover-hash lemma (cf.
Lemma 2) there exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that
∆
(
(RA,Re(A, s),Re(A, s′)); (U,Re(A, s),Re(A, s′)
) ≤ ν(λ)
∆
(
(RA,Ra,Re(A, s′)); (U,u,Re(A, s′)
) ≤ ν(λ),
for uniform U, a and u. Therefore, the leakage Re(A, s′) increases the statistical distance of
the component C1 of a normal ciphertext from uniform only by a negligible term, and the same
also holds for a uniform “ciphertext” (C1, c2). This is sufficient for Theorem 4 which guarantees
the security of the PKE scheme.
Given leakage Re(A, s′), ciphertexts C = (C1, c2) = (RA,Rt + mbp/2c), C ′ = (C′1, c′2) =
(R′A,R′t′ + m′bp/2c), and auxiliary information aux := (t, t′, s′,R′,m′,Re(A, s)), we can
compute
C˜ := (C1 + C
′
1, c2 + R
′t′)
which is a ciphertext for randomness R+R′. For computing C˜ ′ we need to exploit the knowledge
of the leakage and compute
C˜ ′ := (C1 + C′1, c
′
2 + C1s + Re(A, s
′)),
which is also a ciphertext for randomness R + R′. Clearly, R + R′ does not have the same dis-
tribution as R. Hence, a ciphertext using randomness R is not statistically close to a ciphertext
with randomness R + R′. We modify the encryption algorithm of the PKE scheme from Sec-
tion 4 such that it uses randomness R∗ := R+R′ instead of R and call it Π′ = (Gen,Enc′,Dec).
The correctness of the decryption will hold, when sampling R, R′ from [−b√p/4c, b√p/4c]`×m.
The leftover-hash lemma (cf. Lemma 2) still yields
∆ ((A,u1,u2,R
∗A,R∗u1,R∗u2); (A,u1,u2,B)) ≤ `
2
4
√
22(n+2) log p+m−m log(p−1).
Thus, one could still choose m = 3n to obtain a negligible statistical distance.
Finally, we obtain a slightly weaker randomness fusion property where re-randomized ci-
phertexts of PKE Π are statistically close to ciphertexts of Π′. This variant is indeed sufficient
to apply the Naor-Yung paradigm with shared randomness (cf. Theorem 1).
28
The protocol. In order to instantiate our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm with the Sub-
set Sum based PKE scheme from Section 4.2, we need to construct a Sigma-protocol for the
following language:
LBMVNY = {(pk , pk ′, C, C ′) : ∃R ∈ [−b
√
p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m,m ∈ Z`2
s.t. C = (RA,Rt + mbp/2c), C ′ = (RA,Rt′ + mbp/2c)},
where C := (C1, c2) and C
′ := (C′1, c′2) are encryptions with common randomness R, us-
ing independent public keys pk := (A, t) and pk ′ := (A, t′), and common public parameters
params = (A, n, p,m, `).6
It is easy to see that the above language can be equivalently defined as follows:
LBMVNY = {(A′,B) ∈ Zm×(n+1)p × Z`×(n+1)p : ∃R ∈ Z`×mp s.t. RA′ = B and ‖R‖∞ ≤ b
√
p/2c},
where A′ := (A, t − t′). This language can be seen as syndrome decoding or Knapsack
LWE [MM11] over Zp. Stern gave a Sigma-protocol for this language over Z2, where the norm
is the Hamming weight [Ste93]. Unfortunately, the protocol heavily relies on permutations
over Zn2 , which preserve the Hamming weight. To extend the protocol to Zq for non-binary R,
one would need to extend the permutation to an isometry for the desired norm that keeps the
algebraic structure.
Therefore, we design the following Sigma-protocol Σ = (P,V), based on rejection sampling
used by Lyubashevsky [Lyu09]. This principle was improved by Ducas et al. [DDLL13], and
also applied by, e.g., Damgard et al. [DPSZ12]. Rejection sampling is a method to sample from
an arbitrary target probability distribution f , given a source bound to a different probability
distribution g. Here, a sample x is picked from g and is accepted with probability f(x)/(M ·g(x))
where M is some positive real; in case of rejection, the process is restarted. If f(x) ≤ Mg(x)
for all x, it is not hard to prove that this procedure produces exactly the distribution of f .
Furthermore, M is the expected number of times the procedure will need to be restarted, and
it is crucial to keep M as small as possible. Moreover, given that rejection sampling can be
interpreted as sampling a random point (xi, yi) in the area under the distribution M · g and
accepting if and only if yi ≤ f(xi), reducing the area between g and f will reduce M .
The following interactive protocol is designed to provide a proof pi only about a statement
b := rA′, for witness r ∈ R; however, repeating it ` times (which is the number of rows into
the actual witness R matrix), we obtain a proof system for the whole target language. It works
as described below, for a witness with norm ‖r‖∞ ≤ v.
• P picks a vector y according to the distribution Dmd , where Dmd is the discrete uniform
distribution over [−d, d]; hence, it sets A′ := (A, t−t′), as defined for the language LBMVNY ,
to compute α := yA′.
• V replies with a random bit β←$ {0, 1}.
• P computes γ := βr + y; if ‖γ‖∞ ≤ d− v, then it sends γ and otherwise aborts.
• Given a transcript (α, β,γ), the verifier accepts it if and only if:
1. ‖γ‖∞ ≤ d− v;
2. γA′ = α + βb.
Note that we multiplied y with the matrix A′ in order to obtain the commitment α, because
for α = y and β = 1 the verifier could obtain the witness r trivially by subtracting γ −α. The
distribution of γ depends on the distribution of βr, and thus on the distribution of r. In fact,
6Strictly speaking, each public key should contain a different matrix A; however the above variant is still
secure and yields a smaller key and proof size.
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the distribution of γ is almost Dmd shifted by the vector r when β = 1; otherwise γ = y and
the distribution of γ is exactly Dmd . Instead, the target distribution for γ is D
m
t , that denotes
the discrete uniform distribution over [−d+ v, d− v]m. For simplicity, we first analyze the case
m = 1. When β = 0, the distribution g behaves as the uniform distribution over [−d, d], with
probability mass function:
g1(x) =
1
2d+ 1
. (5)
Meanwhile, when β = 1, we need the convolution between g1(x) and the discrete uniform
distribution over [−v, v], from which both y and r are sampled. The possible outcomes (from
the joint distribution) are obtained by multiplying (2d+1) · (2v+1), where 2d+1 is the amount
of possible values for y and 2v+1 is the amount of possible values for r. Hence, inside the target
interval [−d+v, d−v], the accepting γ can assume 2v+1 combinations of outcomes from the joint
distribution, with probability 2v+1(2d+1)·(2v+1) =
1
2d+1 . Moreover, in the intervals [−d − v,−d + v]
and [d − v, d + v] we have a trapezoidal behavior, so that we obtain the following probability
mass function:
g2(x) =

u(x+ d+ v + 1) if − d− v ≤ x < −d+ v
1
2d+1 if − d+ v ≤ x < d− v
u(d+ v − x+ 1) if d− v ≤ x < d+ v
where u = ((2d+1)·(2v+1))−1. It follows that γ is sampled from the distribution 12g1(x)+12g2(x),
where both g1(x) and g2(x) share the same probability mass function
1
2d+1 within the interval
[−d+ v, d− v].
As stated before, the target distribution Dmt is the discrete uniform distribution over [−d+
v, d− v]; therefore, the probability mass function of the distribution f is:
f(x) =
1
2(d− v) + 1 .
With the aim of providing a bound for d, given that f(x)/g(x) ≤M , we compute f(x)/g(x) =
2d+1
2(d−v)+1 , which is always zero, except in the interval [−d+ v, d− v]. Hence, the probability of
rejecting is (
1− 1
M
)
=
2v
2d+ 1
.
A union bound yields 2mv2d+1 in the general case, i.e., m ∈ N. We set d− v ≤
b√p/2c
2 . Further, for,
e.g., v = Θ(n log2 n), d = Θ(mn log2 n), p = Θ(n4 log4 n) and m = 4n for suitable constants,
the probability of rejecting is a constant. Therefore the protocol runs in expected polynomial
time.
Given the above analysis of the rejection sampling, we can easily prove the special soundness
and HVZK properties of our interactive protocol (the correctness property is easily verified). In
particular:
• Special Soundness: Let (α, β,γ) and (α, β′,γ ′) be two accepting transcripts, where
γ := y + βr, γ′ := y + β′r, and β 6= β′. We can compute
γA′ − γ ′A′ = (γ − γ ′)A′ = (β − β′)b,
where we used the fact that γA′ = α + βb and γ ′A′ = α + β′b. It follows that either
γ−γ ′ or γ ′−γ is the wanted witness, with magnitude ‖γ−γ ′‖∞ ≤ 2(d− v) ≤ b√p/2c =
Θ(n2 log2 n).
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• HVZK: Firstly, the simulator samples γ←$ Dmt to obtain, uniformly at random, an
accepting response. Hence, given that γA′ = α + βb, and that β is provided as input to
the simulator, we can obtain the last value of the simulation by setting α := γA′ − βb.
It is easy to see that this simulation strategy yields an identical distribution to the one of
honest transcripts (α, β,γ).
A drawback of our protocol is that the extracted witness is by a factor n larger than the witness
used to perform the protocol. In order to be compatible with the KDM secure PKE scheme
from Section 4.2, we need to choose m and p somewhat larger such that, on the one hand, the
correctness holds for an extracted witness (i.e., a secret key of norm
√
p) and, on the other hand,
security holds for a secret key of norm n log2 n <
√
p ≈ n2 log2 n. Fortunately, the leftover-hash
lemma still applies for this parameter choice, such that we can still rely on Lemma 2. Hence,
we also obtain security for a secret key of smaller norm (i.e., lower entropy). As a consequence,
the security relates to a Subset Sum instance of a smaller density, and therefore to a stronger
hardness assumption.
6 Conclusion and Open Problems
We have studied a twist of the classical Naor-Yung paradigm [NY90] to boost CPA security to
CCA security, both under key-dependent message and key-leakage attacks. The twist consists
in having the two ciphertexts in the Naor-Yung PKE scheme share the same randomness.
In order to prove security, we require the underlying CPA-secure PKE scheme to satisfy an
additional property. The main benefit of our approach is that one can instantiate the NIZK
in the Naor-Yung PKE more efficiently, as we have explored in the random oracle model. We
have also constructed a new PKE scheme with KDM-CPA security under the Subset Sum
assumption, and showed that such a scheme can be used within our paradigm.
Open problems include to construct a PKE scheme with CPA security under key-leakage
attacks directly based on Subset Sum, or alternatively to show that our construction additionally
satisfies this property.7 Also, it would be interesting to analyze KDM security of our scheme
with multiple keys, and to construct a PKE scheme with KDM-CCA security directly based on
the Subset Sum assumption in the standard model, without relying on NIZK.
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